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WHAT IS ORIGINALISM? THE EVOLUTION OF
CONTEMPORARY ORIGINALIST THEORY
Lawrence B. Solum

I.

Introduction

Debates over “originalism” have been a central focus of contemporary
constitutional theory for three decades. One of the features of this debate has
been disagreement about what “originalism” is. More worrisome is the
possibility that the arguments between contemporary originalists and their
opponents, the “living constitutionalists”, are confused – with each side of the
debate making erroneous assumptions about the content of their opponent’s
theories.
The aim of this chapter is to clarify these debates by providing a history
of contemporary originalism and then developing an account of the core or
focal content of originalist theory. The history reveals that contemporary
originalist theory has evolved – the mainstream of originalist theory began
with an emphasis on the original intentions of the framers but has gradually
moved to the view that the “original meaning” of the constitution is the
“original public meaning” of the text. Even today, originalists disagree among
themselves about a variety of important questions, including the normative
justification for a constitutional practice that adheres to original meaning.
Despite evolution and continued disagreement, however, contemporary
originalist theory has a core of agreement on two propositions. First, almost
all originalists agree that the linguistic meaning of each constitutional
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provision was fixed at the time that provision was adopted. Second,
originalists agree that our constitutional practice both is (albeit imperfectly)
and should be committed to the principle that the original meaning of the
Constitution constrains judicial practice. The question whether living
constitutionalists actually disagree with these core principles of originalist
theory is a complex one – to which we shall return at the end of this chapter.
II.

A Word About the Word: The Origins of “Originalism”

The first appearance of the term “originalism” in Westlaw’s database of legal
periodicals is found in an article by Paul Brest in 1981,1 but Brest had used
both “originalism” and “originalist” in 19802 (in an article that is not included
in the data base). So far as Brest knows, he coined the word.3 Here is how
Brest defined “originalism”:
By “originalism” I mean the familiar approach to constitutional adjudication that
accords binding authority to the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its
adopters.4

The disjunctive “or” in the last clause of Brest’s definition presaged a
debate among originalists, but what is most striking about this passage is
Brest’s assumption that his audience already understood the features of the
view that he was about to criticize. Brest’s neologism caught on, and the
words “originalism” and “originalist” appear frequently from 1981 onward.5
1

Paul Brest, “The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions
of Normative Constitutional Scholarship”, 90 Yale L.J. 1063 at 1090 (1981).
2
Paul Brest, “The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding”, 60 B.U.L.
Rev. 204 at 234 (1980) [Brest, “Misconceived Quest”].
3
Email exchange between Lawrence B. Solum and Paul Brest, December 2, 2009.
4
Brest, “Misconceived Quest”, supra note 2 at 204.
5
For example, a search on Google’s Books Ngram Viewer reveals no use of the
term before 1980 and a steady increase in use of the word “originalism” in books
published after the early 1980s. See
http://ngrams.googlelabs.com/graph?content=Originalism&year_start=1975&year_
end=2008&corpus=0&smoothing=3 (search for “originalism” from 1975 to 2008 in
the “English” database on Google Books).
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Whatever the origins of the terms “originalism” and “originalist,”
scholarly usage of related phrases extends at least as far back as the 1930s.
The phrase “original meaning” was used in the constitutional context in a
Yale Law Journal article in 1938 discussing the controversy over “substantive
due process”:
There would be far greater advantage in restoring the original meaning of the
‘privileges and immunities’ clause and by the process of inclusion and exclusion
letting the country know what are now federal privileges, than in forcing the court to
draw upon the fathomless depths of the ‘due process’ clause to give effect to their
personal convictions of economic and social propriety.6

It is perhaps no coincidence that the original meaning of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause continues to hold the constitutional stage 70 years later.
The related phrase “original intentions” appeared in 1938, in a closely
related context:
Wholly apart from Bingham’s personal understanding of his phraseology, his original
intentions in drafting it, or the relations existing between the Cleveland and Mahoning
Railroad and other members of the Joint Committee, it is possible that Reverdy
Johnson, in the course of the Committee’s deliberations, or perhaps even in private
conversation with Conkling, mentioned Justice Grier’s decision as among the most
recent involving the due process clause, and in this manner precipitated a frank
discussion of the entire problem of corporate rights.7

And “original understanding” made its first appearance in the Westlaw
database in a well-known 1949 article by Charles Fairman.8
Judicial usage of the “originalism” and the associated phrases “original
meaning,” “original intentions,” and “original understanding” in a
6

Edwin Borchard, “The Supreme Court and Private Rights” 47 Yale L.J. 1051 at
1063 (1938).
7
Howard Jay Graham, “The “Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment”
48 Yale L.J. 171 at 189–90 (1938) (citation omitted).
8
Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?: The Original Understanding” 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 at 5 (1949) (exploring the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s clauses “at the time the Amendment was
adopted”).
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constitutional context seems to post-date academic usage. The first use of the
phrase “original meaning” in the text (exclusive of citations) of an opinion by
a Supreme Court Justice occurred in Justice Black’s dissent in Harper v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections9 in 1966:
Since the Breedlove and Butler cases were decided the Federal Constitution has not
been amended in the only way it could constitutionally have been, that is, as provided
in Article V of the Constitution. I would adhere to the holding of those cases. The
Court, however, overrules Breedlove in part, but its opinion reveals that it does so not
by using its limited power to interpret the original meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause, but by giving that clause a new meaning which it believes represents a better
governmental policy. From this action I dissent.10

The first similar occurrence of “original meaning” in a majority opinion
occurs in a footnote in Justice Powell’s 1977 opinion for the Court in
Ingraham v. Wright.11 “Original understanding” made its first similar
appearance in Justice Harlan’s 1970 dissent and concurrence in Oregon v.
Mitchell.12 “Original intentions” first occurs in Justice Berger’s 1983 dissent
in Solem v. Helm.13 The term “originalist” first occurred in Justice Scalia’s
1995 dissenting opinion in Roper v. Simmons,14 and “originalism” made its
first appearance in Justice Stevens’ 2005 dissenting opinion in Van Orden v.
Perry.15
The word “originalism” is a neologism–a word that was coined for the
purpose of carving up theoretical space. Brest’s original usage introduced an
ambiguity by referring to “text” or “intentions.” In addition, Brest’s new word
resonated–presumably this was deliberate–with other phrases with long
histories of usage in a variety of legal contexts (“original meaning,” “original
9

383 U.S. 663 at 671 (1966)
Ibid.. at 671-2.
11
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 at 670 n. 39 (1977).
12
400 U.S. 112 at 165 (1970).
13
463 U.S. 277 at 310 (1983).
14
543 U.S. 551 at 626 (1977).
15
545 U.S. 677 at 729 (2005).
10
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understanding,” and “original intention”). Moreover, Brest used the terms
“originalism” and “originalist” in order to refer to a position that he was
criticizing. Brest’s term caught on, and eventually was adopted by proponents
of the views that had affinities with the object of his critique. As a
consequence, the words “originalism” and “originalist” are ambiguous–used
by scholars, lawyers, judges, and the public in a variety of different ways. It
seems likely that as a matter of lexicography, “originalism” is a family
resemblance term–with several overlapping senses.
This deep ambiguity in the meaning of originalism is further
complicated by the sociology of the legal academy and the politics of judicial
interpretation. Legal theorists who self-identify as originalists are likely to
strive to police the boundaries of the “originalism,” seeking to exclude
implausible views and to focus debate on the versions of originalism that they
believe are true, correct, or most reasonable. Legal theorists who oppose
originalism may have precisely the opposite motivation, seeking to identify
originalism with its least defensible variations. Political champions of
originalism are likely to focus on simplified “sound bite” versions of the
theory that conflate the content of originalist theory with the goals it seeks to
achieve: “Originalism is the theory that judges should follow the law and not
make it.” Likewise, political opponents might define originalism as a view
that is obviously unpalatable: “Originalism is anti-woman.”
For all these reasons, the road to conceptual clarity in debates about
originalism will be rocky. The quest for agreement on a single definition of
originalism is likely to prove Quixotic. For this reason, stipulated definitions
of originalism should be avoided. Readers of theoretical texts are imperfect,
and the stipulated meaning of “originalism” is likely to be ignored or
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forgotten. A more promising approach should begin with the facts.
“Originalism” is an ambiguous theoretical term. There is a family of
originalist constitutional theories. In order to make progress in the debates
about “originalism,” we will need to map the theoretical space, identifying the
ways in which different versions of originalism vary and the ways in which
they resemble one another.

III.

A Very Short History of Contemporary Originalist Theory

The first step towards an answer to the question, “What is originalism?,” was
an investigation of the origins of the word “originalism.” The second step is a
history of the theories that are associated with that word. The history that is
offered here is necessarily brief, partial, and incomplete. A complete version
of the story would require a long monograph. The aim of the very short
history in Part III is to identify the most important theoretical developments,
with an emphasis on the developments that are most relevant to the current
state of originalist theory.16
A. Original intentions of the framers
Contemporary debates about originalism trace back to the early 1970s. In
1971 Robert Bork wrote “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems”,17 an article that is sometimes considered the opening move in the
development of contemporary originalist theory. Bork’s essay was only

16

For a different view from an earlier time, see Daniel A. Farber, “The Originalism
Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed”, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1085 at 1085 (1989) (offering
a concise “tourist guide” introduction to the “original intent” debate).
17
Robert H. Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems”, 47
Ind. L.J. 1 (1971).
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loosely “originalist” in the contemporary senses of that term. The following
passage is representative:
There appear to be two proper methods of deriving rights from the Constitution. The
first is to take from the document rather specific values that text or history show the
framers actually to have intended and which are capable of being translated into
principled rules. We may call these specified rights. The second method derives rights
from governmental processes established by the Constitution. These are secondary or
derived individual rights. This latter category is extraordinarily important. This
method of derivation is essential to the interpretation of the first amendment, to voting
rights, to criminal procedure and to much else.18

The emphasis on “text” and “history” is recognizably originalist, but
Bork’s notion of “derived rights” is not clearly anchored in original meaning
or original intentions.
In 1976, then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist authored “The
Notion of a Living Constitution”, which, based on the writings of the
Framers, explicitly criticized living constitutionalism and implicitly endorsed
originalism.19 A year later, in 1977, Raoul Berger penned Government by
Judiciary,20 which argued that the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment were contrary to the original intentions of its
Framers. In 1985, then-Attorney General Edwin Meese put originalism on the
political agenda in a well-publicized speech before the American Bar
Association.21 Meese’s speech included the following passage:

18

Ibid. at 17.
William H. Rehnquist, “The Notion of a Living Constitution”, 54 Tex. L. Rev.
693 (1976).
20
Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary (1977).
21
See Edwin Meese III, “Speech Before the American Bar Association” (July 9,
1985), reprinted in The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written Constitution (Paul
G. Cassel ed., 1986), online:< http://www.fed-soc.org/resources/id.49/default.asp>
[Meese, “Speech Before the American Bar Association”]; see also Edwin Meese
III, “The Case for Originalism”, The Heritage Foundation (June 6, 2005)
online:<http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed060605a.cfm>; Lynette
Clemetson, “Meese’s Influence Looms in Today’s Judicial Wars”, N.Y. Times, Apr.
17, 2005, at A1.
19

8
In reviewing a term of the Court, it is important to take a moment and reflect upon the
proper role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional system. The intended role of
the judiciary generally and the Supreme Court in particular was to serve as the
“bulwarks of a limited constitution.” The judges, the Founders believed, would not
fail to regard the Constitution as “fundamental law” and would “regulate their
decisions” by it. As the “faithful guardians of the Constitution,” the judges were
expected to resist any political effort to depart from the literal provisions of the
Constitution. The text of the document and the original intention of those who framed
it would be the judicial standard in giving effect to the Constitution.22

Bork, Rehnquist, Berger, and Meese did not develop anything that
approaches a full-blown constitutional theory, but their views suggested
something like the theory we now call “original intentions originalism,” the
view that the original intentions of the Framers should guide constitutional
interpretation.

B. The misconceived quest and the original understanding of original
intentions
Following Berger’s book, but five years before Meese’s speech, Paul Brest
wrote “The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding”,23 one of the
most cited and influential contributions to constitutional theory.24 Brest’s
article advanced a variety of criticisms of original intentions originalism,
including: (1) the difficulty of ascertaining the institutional intention of a
multimember body in general;25 (2) the particular problems associated with
identifying the intention of the members of the Philadelphia Convention and
the various state ratifying conventions in the case of the original Constitution
and of Congress and the various state legislatures in the case of

22

Meese, Speech Before the American Bar Association, ibid.
Brest, “Misconceived Quest”, supra note 2.
24
A Westlaw search of the JLR database for the string corresponding to the title
yielded 719 hits on November 10, 2008.
25
Brest, “Misconceived Quest”, supra note 2 at 214.
23
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amendments;26 (3) the problem of determining the level of generality or
specificity of the Framers’ and ratifiers’ intentions;27 (4) the problem of
inferring intentions from constitutional structure;28 (5) the difficulty of
translating the Framers’ and ratifiers’ beliefs and values given changes in
circumstances over time;29 (6) the problem of the democratic legitimacy – that
is, that the Constitution of 1789 was drafted and ratified without the
participation of women and slaves;30 and (7) the problem of instability, in that
an inflexible constitutional order cannot adapt to changing circumstances.31
Brest had much more to say, and there were many other critics of originalism,
but this list is sufficient to illustrate the reception that originalism received
from constitutional theorists in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Brest also raised the problem of the Framers’ and ratifiers’ interpretive
intentions,32 and his remarks anticipated Jefferson Powell’s 1985 article, “The
Original Understanding of Original Intent”.33 Powell’s article interrogated the
assumption that original intentions originalists believed that the Framers’
themselves expected that the Constitution would be interpreted to conform to
their intentions. Although Powell conceded that there were references to
“original intention” and “intent of the framers” in the constitutional discourse
of the Founding era, he argued that those phrases did not represent an early
version of original intentions originalism. Instead, he argued that “[t]he
Philadelphia framers’ primary expectation regarding constitutional
26

Ibid. at 214–15.
Ibid. at 216–17.
28
Ibid. at 217-18.
29
Ibid. at 219-22.
30
Ibid. at 230.
31
Ibid. at 231.
32
Ibid. at 215-16.
33
H. Jefferson Powell, “The Original Understanding of Original Intent”, 98 Harv.
L. Rev. 885 (1985).
27
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interpretation was that the Constitution, like any other legal document, would
be interpreted in accord with its express language.”34 Both the evidence for
Powell’s thesis and its implications are controversial, but its effect on
scholarly opinion was profound. The strongest implication of the article is
that original intentions originalism is a self-effacing theory because it requires
that the Framers’ intentions regarding interpretation be respected, but those
intentions require that the Framers’ intentions be disregarded.
Brest and Powell were hardly the only critics of original intentions
originalism, but their arguments, combined with others, were important in
forming the scholarly consensus of the era.35 Essentially, that consensus
accepted the claim that the original intentions of the Framers could not serve
as the basis for a viable theory of constitutional interpretation and
construction.36

C. Original understanding of the ratifiers
During this period, the originalism debate took a brief detour into a variant of
original intentions originalism that emphasized the understandings37 or
34

Ibid. at 903.
This is not an intellectual history of the originalism debates, and I am not
claiming that either Brest or Powell articulated the first or best version of the
claims they made. No string cite can do justice to the literature. There were many
influential critics of original intentions originalism; one of the most important was
Ronald Dworkin. See Ronald Dworkin, “The Forum of Principle”, 56 N.Y.U. L. R.
Rev. 469 at 470 (1981).
36
Randy E. Barnett, “An Originalism for Nonoriginalists”, 45 Loy. L. Rev. 611
(1999) (“The received wisdom among law professors is that originalism is dead.”)
[Barnett, “An Originalism for Nonoriginalists”].
37
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning”, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1275 at 1317 (1996) (defining “originalism” as “the
theory that the original understanding of those who wrote and ratified various
constitutional provisions determines their current meaning”) [Fallon, “Manageable
Standards”].
35
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intentions of the ratifiers – either the state ratifying conventions understood as
corporate bodies or of the individuals who attended the ratifying conventions
and voted in favor of ratification.38
We need not tarry long over this twist in the debate. The move to
ratifiers’ understanding or intent is best understood in conjunction with
popular sovereignty as a justification for originalism. The ratifiers, rather than
the Framers, could plausibly be viewed as expressing the political will of “We
the People.” However, all of the problems that attended the equation of
constitutional meaning with Framers’ intent seem to attach to ratifiers’ intent.
Moreover, evidence may be even more difficult to obtain39 and the problems
of group intention – of multiple conventions with multiple members – even
more confounding with respect to ratifiers’ intent. To the extent that the
ratifiers’ understanding is rooted in the public meaning, the emphasis on
ratifiers is merely a way station on the journey from original intentions to
original public meaning.40
38

See Charles A. Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History (1969) at
157-88 (arguing that originalism should look to the intent of the ratifiers as well as
of the Framers); see also Charles A. Lofgren, “The Original Understanding of
Original Intent”, 5 Const. Comment. 77 at 113 (1988) (“Indeed, it is not too much
to say that at least some of the founders saw the ratifiers’ historical or subjective
intent as a check on constructions which cut loose from the original understandings
of the sovereign people.”).
39
See Henry P. Monaghan, “Our Perfect Constitution”, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 at
375 n.130 (1981) (“Although the intention of the ratifiers, not the Framers, is in
principle decisive, the difficulties of ascertaining the intent of the ratifiers leaves
little choice but to accept the intent of the Framers as a fair reflection of it.”).
40
Similar points could be made about what might be called “popular meaning,” the
view that the relevant intentions or understandings should be those of “We the
People” or the popular sovereign—the relevant actor for popular constitutionalism.
If the relevant intentions are those of each and every citizen, then popular
constitutionalism suffers from compounded versions of the ills that afflict
intentionalism. If popular constitutionalism points to public meaning, then it is
simply another version of original-meaning originalism. For discussion of popular
constitutionalism, see Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (2004); see also Larry Alexander &
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D. We the people
The year before Meese gave his speech to the American Bar Association and
Jefferson Powell wrote about the original understanding of original intent,
Bruce Ackerman delivered his Storrs Lectures, entitled “Discovering the
Constitution”, at Yale Law School.41 It was in these lectures that Ackerman’s
theory of constitutional politics made its first wide impression on the
community of constitutional scholars. Ackerman’s theory distinguishes
ordinary politics – what happens when state legislatures and Congress enact
statutes, for example – from constitutional politics. Here is the very first
statement of Ackerman’s view, dualism, in the second lecture:
[T]he Federalist elaborates a dualistic conception of political life. One form of
political action – I shall call it constitutional politics – is characterized by Publian
appeals to the common good, ratified by a mobilized mass of American citizens
expressing their assent through extraordinary institutional forms. Although
constitutional politics is the highest kind of politics, it should be permitted to
dominate the nation’s life only during rare periods of heightened political
consciousness. During the long periods between these constitutional moments, a
second form of activity – I shall call it normal politics – prevails. Here, factions try to
manipulate the constitutional forms of political life to pursue their own narrow
interests. Normal politics must be tolerated in the name of individual liberty; it is,
however, democratically inferior to the intermittent and irregular politics of public
virtue associated with moments of constitutional creation.42

Ackerman’s theory served as an answer to Alexander Bickel’s
countermajoritarian difficulty: the problem of democratic legitimacy that
attends judicial review by unelected judges.43 Judges as faithful agents of the
“We the People,” who legislate in rare constitutional moments – or later
Lawrence B. Solum, “Popular? Constitutionalism?”, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1594
(2005) (book review).
41
Bruce A. Ackerman, “The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution”, 93
Yale L.J. 1013 (1984) [Ackerman, “Discovering the Constitution”].
42
Ibid. at 1022–23 (citations omitted).
43
See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics (1962); see also Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R.
Castillo, eds., The Judiciary and American Democracy: Alexander Bickel, the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty and Contemporary Constitutional Theory (2005).
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“periods” – act more democratically than do legislators, who serve special
interests and escape the people’s attention during the extended periods of
ordinary politics.
As developed in the Storrs Lectures, Ackerman’s theory focused on
three constitutional moments: the Founding (the Constitution of 1789),
Reconstruction (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments), and
the New Deal. Here is the initial appearance of that idea in the lectures:
Speaking schematically, this historical story is dominated by three peaks of
high importance that tower over valleys full of more particular meanings. The first
peak, of course, is the Founding itself: the framing of the original Constitution and the
Bill of Rights, Marbury v. Madison and McCulloch v. Maryland. The second peak is
constituted by the legal events surrounding the Civil War: the judicial failure in Dred
Scott and the constitutional affirmations of the Civil War Amendments. The third
peak centers around the legitimation of the activist welfare state: the long Progressive
struggle against judicial resistance and the dramatic capitulation by the Old Court
before the New Deal in 1937. Time and again, we return to these moments; the
lessons we learn from them control the meanings we give to our present constitutional
predicaments.44

Because Ackerman’s theory purported to legitimize progressive New
Deal constitutionalism, his view might have been construed as the polar
opposite of originalism, but at a deep level, Ackerman’s theory seemed to
require an account of original meaning. Without employing original meaning,
judicial enforcement of the Constitution could not be legitimized by
democratic constitutional politics. In other words, a theory of original
meaning is required for constitutional content to be determined by “We the
People.”
Ackerman’s development of popular sovereignty theory has been
extraordinarily influential, and others have contributed important work in this

44

Ackerman, “Discovering the Constitution”, supra note 41 at 1051–52.
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vein,45 prominently Akhil Reed Amar,46 Ackerman’s colleague at Yale Law
School. Cass Sunstein has described Amar’s position in the following terms:
[I]n the law schools the most influential originalist may be Akhil Reed Amar,
an ingenious and prolific scholar at Yale Law School. Describing himself as a
“textualist” who is interested in history, Amar is methodologically quite close to
Scalia. He is intensely interested in the text and in the historical record, and he is
generally searching for the original meaning of contested terms. Amar wishes to know
what the Constitution “really means,” and he puts that question as if it were largely or
entirely a matter of excavation.47

Although Sunstein’s interpretation of Amar is surely plausible,
characterizing Ackerman and Amar’s theoretical position in originalist terms
is problematic, in no small part because they both eschew explicit theorizing
about constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless, even if Ackerman and Amar
do not describe their views as originalist, it is clear that their approaches to
the Constitution, which emphasize popular sovereignty and the constitutional
text, have had both direct and indirect influences over contemporary
theoretical debates explicitly concerned with originalism.48

45

See, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, “A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment”,
60 Stan. L. Rev. 895 (2007) [Lash, “A Textual Historical Theory”]; Kurt T. Lash,
“Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis”, 93 Va. L. Rev.
1437 (2007) [Lash, “Originalism”].
46
See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (2005); Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights (1998).
47
Cass R. Sunstein, “Originalism for Liberals”, The New Republic, Sept. 28, 1998,
at 31, online: <http://home.uchicago.edu/~csunstei/originalism.html> (reviewing
Amar, The Bill of Rights, ibid, and Akhil Reed Amar & Alan Hirsch, For the
People (1998)).
48
Thus, it is no accident that Amar and Ackerman’s students describe themselves
as originalists. See, e.g., Lash, “A Textual-Historical Theory”, supra note 45 at
900 (“I will consider the historical record and attempt to identify which of the
possible textual meanings are more or less plausible, given historical evidence of
original public understanding. In this way, I hope to provide an account of the
Ninth Amendment satisfactory in terms of both originalism and textualism.”).
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E. Original public meaning and the new originalism
This sets the stage for what is sometimes called “the New Originalism”49 and
is also labeled “Original Public Meaning Originalism.”50 Whatever the actual
origins of this theory, the conventional story identifies Justice Antonin Scalia
as having a key role. As early as 1986, Scalia gave a speech exhorting
originalists to “change the label from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the
Doctrine of Original Meaning.”51 The phrase “original public meaning” seems
to have entered the contemporary theoretical debates through the work of
Gary Lawson,52 with Steven Calabresi as another “early adopter.”53 The core
idea of the revised theory is that the original meaning of the Constitution is
the original public meaning of the constitutional text.
Randy Barnett54 and Keith Whittington55 have played prominent roles in
the development of the “New Originalism.” Both Barnett and Whittington
base their theories on a foundation of “original public meaning,” but they
build upon the views of Scalia and Lawson in a variety of interesting ways.
49

See, e.g., Keith Whittington, “The New Originalism”, 2 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
599 (2004).
50
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, “An Originalism for Nonoriginalists” supra note 36.
51
Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on
Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in Original Meaning
Jurisprudence: A Sourcebook 101 at 106 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice ed., 1987); see also
Caleb Nelson, “Originalism and Interpretive Conventions”, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519
at 554–55 (2003) (noting that most originalists have accepted Justice Scalia’s
suggestion).
52
See Gary Lawson, “Proving the Law”, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 859 at 875 (1992).
For extended discussions of “original public meaning,” see Vasan Kesavan &
Michael Stokes Paulson, “The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret
Drafting History”, 91 Geo. L.J. 1113 at 1127 (2003); Samuel T. Morison, “The
Crooked Timber of Liberal Democracy”, 2005 Mich. St. L. Rev. 461 at 465.
53
See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, “The President’s Power to
Execute the Laws”, 104 Yale L.J. 541 at 553 (1994).
54
See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution (2004).
55
See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction (1999); Keith E.
Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation (1999).
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For the purposes of this very brief survey, perhaps their most important move
is to embrace the distinction between “constitutional interpretation,”
understood as the enterprise of discerning the semantic content of the
Constitution, and “constitutional construction,” which we might tentatively
define as the activity of determining the legal effect of the constitutional text.
One mode of construction involves judicial specification of constitutional
doctrine when the text is vague, but construction can take place in the
political branches as well.56 This distinction explicitly acknowledges what we
might call the fact of constitutional underdeterminacy: the original meaning
of the text does not fully determine constitutional doctrine or its application to
particular cases.57 With this turn, original-meaning originalists explicitly
embrace the idea that when the original public meaning of the text “runs out,”
application of the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text to a particular
dispute must be guided by something other than original meaning.
Once originalist theory (in some important instantiations) had
acknowledged that vague constitutional provisions required construction, this
step opened the door for reconciliation between originalism and living
constitutionalism. The key figure in that reconciliation has been Jack Balkin
through his influential 2006 and 2007 essays “Abortion and Original

56

Another important early adopter of this distinction (in the context of
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indeterminacy, and underdeterminacy).
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Meaning”58 and “Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption”.59 In
these essays, Balkin argued for a reconciliation of original-meaning
originalism with living constitutionalism according to a theory that might be
called “the method of text and principle.” The meaning of the “text” provides
a constraining framework within which constitutional “principles” operate.
One understanding of Balkin’s view is that the “text” requires interpretation
and the “principles” are matters of constitutional construction.
Predating much of the American work on the New Originalism was
Jeffrey Goldsworthy’s work, addressing the Australian Constitution, but
developed with an explicit awareness of the theoretical debates swirling
around American constitutionalism. Goldsworthy’s first major statement,
“Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation”,60 was published in an
Australian law review in 1997. As Goldsworthy’s work illustrates,
innovations in American constitutional theory may have been anticipated
elsewhere and American theorists have no monopoly on the creation of new
(or the resurrection of old) theoretical constructs.

F. Original applications and original methods
Two very recent ideas deserve particular mention: “original
applications” and “original methods.” The phrase “original applications” or
58
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Legal Theory Blog, Nov. 2, 2007, online:
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“original expected applications” seems to originate with Jack Balkin,61 but
Mark Greenberg and Harry Litman articulated similar distinctions between
“original meaning” and “original practices” and “meaning” and “application”
in their important 1998 article, “The Meaning of Original Meaning”.62
Although Greenberg and Litman deserve the credit for the deepest and most
thorough discussion of the issues, my account here will focus on Balkin’s
formulation, which brings the idea of original expected applications into the
New Originalism, not as a component but rather by way of exclusion.
Greenberg and Litman saw their point primarily as a criticism of originalism;
Balkin sees the same issue, but concludes that originalism is strengthened by
excluding “original expected applications.”63
The distinction is a simple one. The linguistic meaning of a text is one
thing, and expectations about the application of that meaning to future cases
are a different thing. Balkin makes use of the distinction to argue that some
originalists have conflated meaning with expected applications:
Originalists generally assume that if we do not apply the constitutional text in the way
it was originally understood at the time of its adoption we are not following what the
words mean and so will not be faithful to the Constitution as law. But they have
tended to conflate two different ideas – the expected application of constitutional
texts, which is not binding law, and the original meaning, which is. Indeed, many
originalists who claim to be interested only in original meaning, like Justice Antonin
Scalia, have encouraged this conflation of original meaning and original expected
application in their practices of argument.64
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The fact that original expected applications are distinct from original
meanings should not imply that the two are unrelated. Expected applications
of a text may offer evidence about its meanings, even if these applications are
neither decisive evidence of meaning nor meaning itself.
Of course, some originalists may contest Balkin’s move and argue that
original expectations originalism is viable. The justification could be that
reliance on original expectations is the distinctive characteristic that marks
originalist theories as originalist.65 But this view appears incorrect given the
history of originalist thought, and it is certainly contrary to the theories of
New Originalists like Balkin, Barnett, and Whittington.
Another very recent development is the emergence of what might be
called “original methods originalism,” the view that the original meaning of
the Constitution includes the methods of interpretation that the Framers,
ratifiers, and/or public of the Founding era could, would, or should have
expected to guide constitutional practice. This view is strongly associated
with Michael Rappaport and John McGinnis.66 They write:
[T]he focus of originalism should be on how a reasonable person at the time of the
Constitution’s adoption would have understand (sic) its words and thought they
should be interpreted. The Constitution’s provisions were based on commonly
accepted meanings and the interpretative rules of the time. Some of the provisions had
clear meanings. Others may have seemed ambiguous, but the enactors would have
believed that their future application would be based [on] the interpretive rules
accepted at the time. Thus, their assessment of the meaning and the desirability of the
Constitution would depend on the interpretive rules that they thought would apply.67
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We can call this approach “original methods originalism,” reflecting its
commitment to the methods of interpretation that characterized the Founding
era. Notice that McGinnis and Rappaport’s formulation of their idea does not
embrace the distinction between interpretation and construction in the
Whittington/Barnett sense.68
In a different vein, an important contribution to understanding the
implications of the New Originalism appeared in a 2006 article by Richard
Fallon, titled “Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional
Meaning”.69 Fallon does not embrace originalism, but he identified the key
distinction between the meaning of the Constitution (its semantic content) and
implementing rules of constitutional law (legal content):
Despite large apparent differences between originalism and nonoriginalist theories,
originalist and nonoriginalist judges converge in their decisions surprisingly often.
Given the strident debates among constitutional theorists, one well might wonder how
so much agreement could eventuate. The reason, I would suggest, is that what we call
constitutional theories or theories of constitutional interpretation are often theories
about constitutional meaning that implicitly accept the permissibility of a disparity
between constitutional meaning and implementing doctrine. If constitutional theories
fix the meaning of the Constitution, but stipulate that implementing doctrines
sometimes permissibly diverge from it, then such theories are less complete and thus
less practically significant than their proponents suggest.70

Fallon’s distinction between the semantic content of the Constitution
and the legal content of constitutional law put the following question of
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contribution on the table: How does the semantic content contribute to legal
content?
G. New critics of the new originalism
The “New Originalism” has sparked a new wave of criticism.71 The first of
the new critics is Stephen Griffin, the author of “Rebooting Originalism”,72 a
powerful critique of the New Originalism. Griffin’s critique has thoroughly
absorbed the theoretical significance of the shift from original intentions to
original public meaning, but it is not clear that he fully appreciates the
importance of the Whittington/Barnett distinction between construction and
interpretation.73 Although Griffin has a variety of important and well-argued
criticisms of the new originalists, two features of his article are especially
important for present purposes. First, Griffin’s core argument against the New
Originalism is normative: he argues that consistent and exclusive use of
originalist methodology would represent a major change in interpretive
practice and that originalists must therefore offer a normative justification for
their theory.74 Second, Griffin’s critique does not consider the possibility that
original-meaning originalism might include a semantic thesis – a
nonnormative claim about the linguistic meaning of the Constitution.75

71

See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, “Heller and the New Originalism”, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 609
(2008).
72
Stephen M. Griffin, “Rebooting Originalism”, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1185 (2008).
73
The distinction is never discussed in a theoretical way. The first mention
appears on page 34 of his essay. Ibid. at 1217.
74
Ibid. at 1196-1205.
75
No variant of the root word “semantic” appears in Griffin’s article. Although the
term “meaning” and its variants appear numerous times, there is no indication that
Griffin appreciates the possibility that originalism might be a semantic theory.

22

A second new critic is Mitchell Berman, whose critique of originalism
is tendentiously titled “Originalism is Bunk”.76 Berman’s essay is deep and
rich, raising some old objections to originalism, providing new foundations
for others, and developing new positions. One of the crucial moves in his
piece is his argument that the term “Originalism” (when capitalized) should
be reserved for the strong claim that original meaning, whatever that might
be, should trump other considerations in constitutional practice. He
summarizes this claim as follows:
Originalism proper is strong originalism–the thesis that original meaning either is the
only proper target of judicial constitutional interpretation or that it has at least lexical
priority over any other candidate meanings the text might bear (again, contrary
judicial precedents possibly excepted). [FN49] It entails (but is not equivalent to) the
thesis that nothing that transpires after ratification of a particular constitutional
provision, save a subsequent constitutional amendment, has operative (as opposed to
evidential) bearing on what courts ought to identify as constitutional meaning.77

Berman’s identification of “Originalism” (with a capital “O”) with what
he calls “strong originalism” is surely mistaken. For example, Justice Scalia’s
(paradigmatically originalist) opinion in Heller did not dismiss precedent as
irrelevant; instead, he argued that the only relevant precedent, United States v.
Miller,78 was distinguishable.79
In 2006, the New Originalist theorist, Randy Barnett, wrote “Scalia’s
Infidelity: A Critique of Faint-Hearted Originalism”, which explicitly
disagrees with Justice Antonin Scalia on the question of force, contending
that Scalia allows departure from original meaning on the basis of three
76
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factors: (1) precedent, (2) justiciability, and (3) settled historical practice.80 In
addition to Scalia, originalists of various stripes have taken the position that
original meaning can be trumped by precedent for a variety of reasons and is
subject to a variety of constraints, as evidenced by the work of Kurt Lash, Lee
Strang, and this author.81
Confining “Originalism” (in its focal meaning) to the view that original
meaning must trump all other considerations is misleading. Moreover, this
move has the unfortunate effect of defining the topography of argument in a
way that eliminates plausible forms of originalism from the originalist camp,
leaving only the most implausible and extreme views in contention. The
equivalent move by a critic of nonoriginalism would be to define
“Nonoriginalism” with a capital “N” as the view that “original meaning” in
any form can never be considered in constitutional interpretation or
construction. A more productive characterization of the debate might focus on
three disagreements between originalists and nonoriginalists: (1) debates over
the question whether the linguistic meaning of the Constitution should be
viewed as fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified, (2)
arguments about the relative importance of the original meaning of the text
versus other considerations, such as purpose, practice, precedent, and
80
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principles, and (3) differences over the extent to which constitutional
construction is constrained by the linguistic meaning of the text.
A third source of new criticism is Living Originalism,82 jointly authored
by Thomas Colby and Peter Smith. They state their argument boldly:
In fact, just as with nonoriginalism, there is profound internal disagreement on the
originalist side of the line. A review of originalists’ work reveals originalism to be not
a single, coherent, unified theory of constitutional interpretation, but rather a
smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories that share little in common except a
misleading reliance on a single label.83

The question that Smith and Colby raise is an important one, and we
shall return to it in Part IV of this chapter.

H. District of Columbia v. Heller & McDonald v. City of Chicago
Supreme Court decisions that squarely address the fundamental issues of
constitutional theory are rare, but District of Columbia v. Heller84 is such a
decision. The key passage in the majority opinion is unmistakably originalist:
In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution
was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their
normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.85

The implications of the majority’s conclusion that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to possess and carry weapons were
disputed by Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer in their dissenting opinions.
Justice Stevens, in particular, offered a lengthy dissent, focusing in part on the
82
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purposes that animated the Second Amendment and raising a number of
arguments relevant to the original intentions of the Framers.86
The majority opinion in Heller covers a good deal of territory, much of
it contested by the dissents, but, for the purpose of completing this brief
survey of the contemporary development of originalist theory, the important
feature of Heller is methodological. The Court examined each of the
operative words and phrases in the Second Amendment, examining the
semantic content of “the people,” “keep,” “bear,” and “arms.” The Court
concluded its examination as follows: “Putting all of these textual elements
together, we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry
weapons in case of confrontation.”87 In examining each of the operative words
and phrases, the Court examined evidence of usage from the period the
Second Amendment was proposed and ratified. For example:
Before addressing the verbs “keep” and “bear,” we interpret their object: “Arms.” The
18th-century meaning is no different from the meaning today. The 1773 edition of
Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined “arms” as “weapons of offence, or armour of
defence.” Timothy Cunningham’s important 1771 legal dictionary defined “arms” as
“any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath
to cast at or strike another.”88

Another example:
The phrase “keep arms” was not prevalent in the written documents of the founding
period that we have found, but there are a few examples, all of which favor viewing
the right to “keep Arms” as an individual right unconnected with militia service.
William Blackstone, for example, wrote that Catholics convicted of not attending
service in the Church of England suffered certain penalties, one of which was that
they were not permitted to “keep arms in their houses.”89

Additionally:
86
87
88
89
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At the time of the founding, as now, to ‘bear’ meant to ‘carry.’90

Bracketing the question as to whether Heller’s analysis of the linguistic
evidence was correct, the methodology of Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
was clear: the Court focused on the evidence of the original public meaning
of the text. Given the inevitable differences between judicial practice and
constitutional theory, it is hard to imagine finding a clearer example of
original public meaning originalism in an actual judicial decision.
Heller is not the Supreme Court’s last word on originalism and the right
to bear arms. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court addressed
the question whether the Second Amendment right to bear arms applies to the
states.91 This question implicates a long-standing constitutional controversy.
Many originalists believe that the application of the Bill of Rights (including
the Second Amendment) to the states should be grounded in the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the Supreme Court’s
decisions have settled on the Due Process Clause as the basis for what is
called “incorporation.”92 Although Justice Alito’s plurality opinion contains
originalist passages, it relies on the nonoriginalist approach.93 Justice
Thomas’s concurring opinion, which provided the crucial fifth vote, rested
incorporation on the Privileges or Immunities Clause instead.94
If Heller was a clear endorsement of originalism, McDonald is a mixed
message at best. Prominent originalists, including Randy Barnett, have
praised Justice Thomas’s concurrence and criticized the majority.95 But the
90
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relationship of McDonald to originalism is not a simple one. On the one
hand, McDonald could be read as compatible with an originalism that makes
an exception for deeply entrenched precedent. On the other hand, skeptics
might read McDonald as reflecting antipathy (among the plurality justices)
for any doctrine that would legitimate unenumerated rights.

IV. What is Originalism?
The question “What is originalism?,” is itself ambiguous? One version of the
question asks, “What is the meaning of the word “originalism?” The answer
to that question is that the word is now ambiguous – having several different
related senses in both scholarly and popular discourse. A second version of
the questions is, “What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for content
of a constitutional theory to qualify as ‘originalist’?” That question should be
taken off the table of serious scholarly inquiry. Originalism is not a natural
kind; the term “originalism” is not used to point to the single true and correct
version of originalist theory. It is simply not the case that the theories that we
call “originalist” all share some set of essential characteristics. A third version
of the question might be, “Which member of the family of originalist theories
should be designated (or stipulated) as “originalism” (with or without a
capital “O”) for the purpose of theoretical discussion among constitutional
theorists?” Although it would be possible to pursue the project of reaching
agreement on this question, there are substantial obstacles to be overcome. No
person or institution has authority to settle questions of usage in constitutional
theory. There are powerful incentives for advocates and opponents of
different forms of originalism (both inside and outside the academy) to use
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703964104575335060436777670.
html.
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the term “originalism” in ways that advance their practical or theoretical
agendas. None of these three versions of the what-is-originalism question
identifies a fruitful line of inquiry.
Does the fact that originalism is a family of theories that cannot be
explicated via a series of necessary and sufficient conditions entail the further
conclusion that the question, “What is originalism?,” should be abandoned
altogether? Before we answer that question in the affirmative, we could
consider the possibility that the family of originalist theories can be described
systematically. We may be able to develop a systematic account of the
similarities and differences among the varieties of originalism, and that
account might allow us to identify themes or core ideas that most (if not all)
originalists share.
For example, different versions of originalism offer different accounts
of the determinants of original meaning. A rigorously developed typology
would require a systematic investigation of all the relevant texts, but an
informal survey suggests that the following versions of originalism would
figure prominently: (1) original intentions originalism (the view that the
meaning of the text is determined by the intentions of its authors), with
subvariants for: (a) framers’ intentions, (b) ratifiers’ intentions, and (c)
framers and ratifiers’ intentions; (2) original public meaning originalism (the
view that the meaning of the text is determined by the conventional semantic
meaning of the words and phrases at the time each provision was framed and
ratified); (3) original methods originalism (the view that the original meaning
is the meaning that would have been derived given the methods of
interpretation (and possibly also construction) that were employed at the time

29

each provision was framed and ratified. Doubtless, there are further
variations, both within these three clusters and outside them.
The diversity of theories about the determinants of original meaning
does not entail the further conclusion that there is no agreement among
originalists. Originalists disagree about the question as to what determines
original meaning (intentions, public meanings, methods), but all or almost all
of the originalist writing with which I am familiar agrees on the question as to
when meaning is fixed. Original intentions originalists agree that the relevant
intentions are those of the framers or ratifiers of each provision of the
Constitution: thus, the original meaning of the Constitution of 1789 was fixed
by facts about intentions from the period that starts with the opening of the
Philadelphia Convention and ends when the ratification process was
completed. Original public meaning originalists agree that the conventional
semantic meaning of the words and phrases should also be determined by
linguistic facts at the time each constitutional provision was framed and
ratified. And a similar conclusion holds of original methods originalists.
This pattern of agreement suggests that most or almost all originalists
agree that original meaning was fixed or determined at the time each
provision of the constitution was framed and ratified. We might call this idea
the fixation thesis. It is no surprise that originalists agree on the fixation
thesis. The term “originalism” was coined to describe a family of textualist
and intentionalist approaches to constitutional interpretation and construction
that were associated with phrases like “original intentions,” “original
meaning,” and “original understanding.” These phrases and the word
“originalist” share the root word “origin.” The idea that meaning is fixed at
the time of origination for each constitutional provision serves as the common
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denominator for all off these expressions. Thus, the fixation thesis might be
described as a core idea, around which all or almost all originalist theories
organize themselves.
Almost all originalist theories are theories of constitutional practice –
they have something to say about how officials (especially judges and
paradigmatically Justices of the United States Supreme Court) should
interpret and construe the Constitution. Although it would be theoretically
possible for an originalist theory to limit itself to the purely linguistic claim
that the semantic content of the Constitution is fixed at the time of origin of
each provision, almost all self-identified originalists make further claims
about the implications of that fact for constitutional practice.
The variations among originalists in this second dimension can be
clarified by marking a distinction between semantic content and legal content.
The semantic content of the constitutional text is the linguistic meaning of the
document. But the term “meaning” is itself ambiguous. The constitutional
text has a linguistic meaning, but that meaning is distinct from the legal
implications of the text. Because we sometimes use the word “meaning” to
describe such implications, the “meaning of the Constitution” can refer to set
of legal rules (the body of constitutional doctrine) that mediates between the
text and the decision of particular cases. The legal content of the
constitutional doctrine is simply the set or rules developed by courts (and
other officials) for the application of the text to particular cases.
Although originalists agree that the semantic content of the Constitution
was fixed at the time each provision was framed and ratified, they disagree
about the role that semantic content plays in determining legal content. In
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other words, different originalists have different views about the constraining
force of original meaning. At one end of the spectrum, an originalist might
believe that each and every rule of constitutional law must be identical to the
original meaning of some provision of the Constitution. On that view, much
of the content of contemporary constitutional doctrine would be illegitimate:
since it seems clear that wide swaths of constitutional law are judicial
creations. A more moderate (but still quite strong) version of originalism
might adopt the view that constitutional doctrine cannot contradict the
original meaning, but allow for the development of supplementary rules (for
example, in the case of constitutional provisions that are vague). Further
along the spectrum, some originalists might adopt the position that the
original meaning should constrain constitutional doctrine, but allow for
circumstances in which exceptions are legitimate. One such exception might
focus on the role of precedent: some originalists may believe that the
Supreme Court may legitimately adhere to precedents that are at variation
with the original meaning of the text, where the restoration of the original
meaning would be disruptive, upset justifiable reliance, and so forth. An even
more modest version of originalism might take the position that the original
meaning should govern in cases of first impression, but sanction departures
from original meaning whenever a question of legal doctrine has been settled.
A very weak version of originalism might require officials (such as judges) to
consider the original meaning as one important factor in the determination of
constitutional doctrine, but allow the original meaning to be balanced with a
variety of other considerations, including precedent, contemporary social
interests and values, and so forth. At this end of the spectrum, originalism
will begin to merge with forms of living constitutionalism that acknowledge
that text and original intentions are relevant factors in determining
constitutional applications.
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Although the originalists may disagree about the constraining force of
original meaning, all or almost all originalists agree that original meaning
ought to play an important and substantial role in the determination of
constitutional doctrine. Characteristically, originalists believe that the role of
original meaning should be constraining – that is, that absent exceptional
circumstances (or very weighty reasons), constitutional doctrines that
contradict or contravene the semantic content of the Constitution (as fixed at
the time of origin) are illegitimate. This pattern of agreement and variation
suggests a second idea that forms the core around which originalist theories
are organized. All or almost all originalists agree that the original meaning of
the Constitution should make a substantial contribution to the content of
constitutional doctrine: we might call this idea, the contribution thesis. Most
originalists agree on a fairly strong version of the contribution thesis, which
we might call the constraint principle (constitutional doctrine must be
consistent with original meaning absent very weighty reasons). The
contribution thesis forms a second core idea, around which different versions
of originalism cluster. The constraint principle identifies an important nexus
in that cluster – the mainstream of contemporary originalist theory.
Originalists differ in yet another important respect. Different versions of
originalist theory provide different justifications for the constraining force of
original meaning. Some originalists emphasize the rule of law. Others focus
on the idea of popular sovereignty. Yet others emphasize the notion that the
conventions of legal practice do not permit judges to deliberately overrule the
linguistic meaning of the constitutional text. And still others may make the
claim that adherence to original meaning is justified because it will produce
better decisions in the long run than the alternative methods of constitutional
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interpretation and construction. It seems likely that many originalists will rely
on some combination of these arguments, and others as well.
Of course these variations in the justifications for originalism are
important, but the existence of variations at the level of normative foundation
is to be expected, given the pluralism that characterizes the public culture of
the American polity in general and the academy in particular. Disagreement
at the level of ultimate normative foundations is perfectly consistent with
agreement on core originalist principles as an operative judicial philosophy.
What is originalism? Within the domain of constitutional theory,
originalism is a family of views that cluster around two central ideas, the
fixation thesis and the contribution thesis. All or almost all originalists agree
that the original meaning of the Constitution was fixed at the time each
provision was framed and ratified. Almost all originalists agree that original
meaning must make an important contribution to the content of constitutional
doctrine: most originalists agree that courts should view themselves as
constrained by original meaning and that very good reasons are required for
legitimate departures from that constraint.
What then should we make of Colby and Smith’s claim that originalism
is “a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories that share little in
common except a misleading reliance on a single label”?96 Colby and Smith
are certainly correct that the term “originalism” is not used to describe a
single theoretical position characterized by strong agreement among its
proponents on all the important constituent elements. But this does not entail
the conclusion that the only thing that unifies most (or even almost all)
96
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originalist theories is “misleading reliance on a single label.” The two ideas
that provide the focal point of agreement among almost all originalist
theories, the fixation thesis and the contribution thesis, are directly and
transparently related to the label, “originalism,” and the cognate notions of
“original meaning” or “original understanding.” Originalists agree that the
“meaning” (the semantic content or linguistic meaning) of the constitutional
text was fixed at the time that each provision of the constitution was framed
and ratified. The fixation thesis expresses the idea that the “origin” or “time
of origination” of each constitutional provision fix its meaning, which
originalists call the “original meaning.” There is nothing misleading about the
use of the term “originalism” as the label for this view. Moreover, the family
of originalist theories is organized around another central idea, the fixation
thesis and its strong variant, the constraint principle. Almost all originalists
agree that the original meaning ought to make a substantial and important
contribution to constitutional doctrine, and most originalists make the
stronger claim that this contribution ought to constrain constitutional doctrine
(absent very good reasons for departure from the original meaning).
What about the important differences that remain? Does the fact that
originalists disagree about important matters somehow ground an argument
against the validity of the best versions of originalist theory? Initially, it is
difficult to see how this argument might go. Colby and Smith are certainly
correct to the extent that they argue that originalism cannot claim strong
theoretical unity as a virtue – to the extent that originalists have made that
claim they are simply incorrect. Originalism is a family of theories that
cluster around the fixation thesis and the contribution thesis – not a single
theory whose proponents agree on all the important details.
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But from the fact that originalists almost all agree about two core ideas
but disagree about much else, it does not follow that no version of originalism
is correct. Consider the analogous situation that holds in the natural sciences.
Suppose that at one stage in the development of the theory of evolution, there
were competing accounts of the mechanism by which natural selection
actually occurred. (Until the discovery of DNA, the actual mechanism was
uncertain.) From this fact, it would surely not follow that no version of the
theory of evolution could be true or that competing versions of the theory
were united only by a “misleading label.” The more sensible response to
theoretical disagreement is to ask the question, “Which version of the theory
is right, correct, or best?” The argument that evolution must be wrong
because evolutionary biologists disagree about important questions is simply
a subtle variation on the genetic fallacy (no pun intended).
The originalist family of theories is actually relatively immature as
academic theories go. One might read the progression from original intentions
of the framers to the understandings of the ratifiers to the original public
meaning of the text as a story of increasing fracture and degeneration, but the
same narrative may eventually come to be seen as a story of progress and
increasing sophistication.
Perhaps the most worrisome and most persistent disagreement among
originalists is the one tacitly identified by Brest when he coined the term
“originalism” – originalists continue to disagree about the role of “original
intentions” and “original public meaning.” Colby and Smith emphasize this
worry:
[O]riginalists’ specific claims that their approach alone properly treats the
Constitution as a form of law and properly limits the judiciary to its appropriate role
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in a democratic society . . . start from the premise that originalism (and only
originalism) treats the Constitution as having a fixed and determinate meaning. Yet
the meaning that a committed originalist judge would find obviously turns on the
particular brand of originalism that the judge applies. And over the last thirty-five
years, that meaning has been anything but fixed. A judge committed to the originalist
enterprise would once have invoked original intent, and would today have the freedom
to choose from a smorgasbord that includes original intent and many other originalist
approaches.97

Colby and Smith exaggerate to the extent that they claim that
theoretical divergence among originalists would give judges discretion to pick
and choose among originalist theories – each judge would be bound across
cases to employ the theory she believed was correct, but the essence of their
point is correct: there are real and substantial differences between the
competing versions of originalist theory.
But the importance of the disagreement between intentionalist and
public-meaning originalists should not be exaggerated. The form of
intentionalism that has emerged in recent years emphasizes the semantic
intentions of the authors of the constitutional text – best understood as a
complex combination of the framers and ratifiers. The view is that the
linguistic meaning of the text is a function of the intentions (or mental states)
of its authors. Public meaning originalism takes the view that the linguistic
meaning of the constitutional text is a function of its conventional semantic
meaning – which is determined by patterns of usage among the relevant
linguistic community.
It is possible for intended meaning and public meaning to diverge, but
in the case of a legal text, such divergence will be rare in practice. The
authors of the constitutional text knew that those who would read and
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interpret the text would have limited access to information about idiosyncratic
semantic intentions: for example, the records of the Philadelphia convention
and the ratifying conventions were not publicly available in the era that
immediately followed ratification. For this reason, the semantic intentions of
the ratifiers are likely to closely track original public meaning – a point that is
recognized by sophisticated originalists of both the intentionalist and publicmeaning varieties. And it is no surprise that this divide in originalist theory is
accompanied by agreement (in principle) in application. Originalist theory
must account for linguistic facts on the ground – and this means that such
theories must converge in order to adequately account for the relevant
evidence.
V. Originalism and Living Constitutionalism
The chief aim of this chapter is a modest one, to lay a foundation that can
help to clarify and sharpen debates about originalist constitutional theory. The
strategy has been to address the question, “What is originalism?,” in the
context of the evolution or development of originalist theory. In this
penultimate section of the chapter, these efforts will be applied to the debate
between originalists and living constitutionalists.
The first and perhaps the most important point is that it misleading to
characterize controversies between originalists and living constitutionalists as
a single debate. There are several versions of originalism, and it seems likely
that there are many versions of “living constitutionalism.” The first best
approach to that fact would involve an investigation of “living
constitutionalism” that parallels the exploration of originalism undertaken in
this chapter, but on this occasion, we must settle for the second best approach
by relying on a representative example of living constitutionalism as a
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starting point. Justice William Brennan of the United States Supreme Court
offered an influential formulation of living constitutionalism:
To remain faithful to the content of the Constitution, therefore, an approach to
interpreting the text must account for the existence of the substantive value choices
and must accept the ambiguity inherent in the effort to apply them to modern
circumstances. The Framers discerned fundamental principles through struggles
against particular malefactions of the Crown: the struggle shapes the particular
contours of the articulated principles. But our acceptance of the fundamental
principles has not and should not bind us to those precise, at times anachronistic,
contours.98

Brennan’s formulation allows us to identify two ideas that are
associated with living constitutionalism. The first idea is that constitutional
principles must be adapted to changing circumstances. The freedoms of
speech and of the press at the time of the framing and ratification of the First
Amendment had “particular contours” adapted to the communications
technologies of the late-Eighteenth century. These principles will take on
different contours when applied to the early Twenty-First Century world of
the Internet. The second idea is somewhat different, and might be at odds
with Brennan’s formulation. One might believe that constitutional practice
should reflect changing values as well as changing circumstances. On this
view, the set of “fundamental principles” might grow and change, while the
constitutional text remains the same.
Are living constitutionalism and originalism competing theories? That
question can and should be reformulated as a series of inquiries. Are some
versions of originalism consistent with living constitutionalism? Are other
versions incompatible? Once the question is reformulated in this way, it
becomes clear that there are both compatibilist and incompatibilist stories to
tell about the relationship between living constitutionalism and originalism.
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The compatibilist story about the relationship between living
constitutionalism and originalism can be articulated via the distinction
between constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction that is
associated with the New Originalism. Compatibilism could be the view that
originalism and living constitutionalism have separate domains. Originalism
has constitutional interpretation as its domain: the linguistic meaning of the
Constitution is fixed. Living constitutionalism has constitutional construction
as its domain: the vague provisions of the constitution can be given
constructions that change over time in order to adapt to changing values and
circumstances. A fully specified living constitutionalism would have to
provide a theory of constitutional construction that satisfies this description,
and we can imagine that there could be a variety of such theories.
If living constitutionalism accepts the fixation thesis, some theory of
semantic content, and some version of the contribution thesis, then living
constitutionalism is committed to the idea that the constitutional text provides
constitutional law a hard core. Originalists and some living constitutionalists
could agree that the hard core of determinant constitutional meaning should
not yield to changing circumstances and values and agree that in the
“construction zone” created by the abstract, vague, and general provisions of
the text, constitutional doctrine can “live” and “grow” in response to
changing circumstances and values.
But some living constitutionalist may deny that there is a hard core.
They might believe that even the core of constitutional law is malleable and
subject to manipulation. That is, they might assert that the living constitution
has a soft core. What then about incompatibilism?
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There are at least two different ways in which living constitutionalism
could make assertions that are inconsistent with originalism. One possibility
is that living constitutionalism is a theory of linguistic meaning. That is,
living constitutionalists could be understood as denying the fixation thesis
and asserting that the semantic meaning of a given constitutional provision
changes in response to changing circumstances. But there is another version
of living constitutionalism that would result in incompatibilism. Some living
constitutionalists may deny what I have called the constraint principle. This
version of living constitutionalism could accept the claims made by the most
modest versions of originalism (for example, that original meaning should be
an important factor in the determination of constitutional doctrine) but deny
the claim that original meaning should strongly constrain judicial
interpretation and construction of the Constitution. This view can be stated
somewhat tendentiously to bring out the feature that creates the
incompatibility. Some living constitutionalists may believe that courts should
have the power to amend the Constitution in order to eliminate what Justice
Brennan might have called the “anachronistic contours” of the constitutional
text. Proponents of this view are not likely to use the word “amendment” to
describe this power but that word seems an accurate characterization of the
implications of their position.
Of course, this account of compatibilist and incompatibilist stories
about originalism and living constitutionalism is only a sketch. Filling it out
would require a careful reconstruction of the actual positions held by various
participants in contemporary debates about constitutional theory. The sketch
was offered to illustrate the importance of clarity in these debates. If we begin
with the assumption that originalism must be incompatible with living
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constitutionalism, that assumption may well obscure the most important
issues. Originalists and living constitutionalists may find common ground on
very issues that they believe are the heart of the controversy. Once these
misconceptions are cleared away, the new ground for contestation may look a
bit different and new issues may take center stage.

VI. Conclusion

One of the goals of this chapter has been to motivate a reorientation of the
debates about originalism in constitutional theory. Constitutional theory can
be practiced as politics by other means. Originalism can be viewed as the
“conservative” theory, and living constitutionalism as the “liberal theory,” but
that picture is oversimplified at best. There is an alternative to the
politicization of constitutional theory. Originalism and living
constitutionalism can be debated on the intellectual merits, but that will only
occur if participants in the debates view these theories in their best light and
apply the principle of charity to the arguments of their opponents.
“Originalism” is an ambiguous term. The family of contemporary
originalist constitutional theories contains substantial diversity, and there may
be no single thesis upon which all self-described originalists agree. Despite
the variety of originalist theories, there are two central ideas that serve as the
focal point or core of contemporary originalism. Almost all originalists agree
that the original meaning of the Constitution was fixed at the time each
provision was framed and ratified. Most originalists agree that the original
meaning of the Constitution should strongly constrain the content of
constitutional doctrine.

